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toxin, y, and the energy available for growth, f -as both require the generation of 75 protein: 76 f (y) = 1 − ay .
(2)
The fitness function of a focal bacterium will be the product of the probability it invades 77 a host and the growth of the bacterium once it has successfully invaded (β(z) · f (y)):
78 ω(y, z) = 1 − ay 1 + e −(nz−k) .
( 3) Equation (3) illustrates that producing the Cry toxin has a cost to the individual by 79 reducing its growth, f (y). However, it is beneficial to the group, including our focal 80 individual, as it increases the chance of successful invasion, β(z). 81 We seek an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which is the individual strategy at 82 fixation which cannot be invaded by some rare alternative strategy. Following Taylor and 83 Frank (1996) , we construct an expression for the change in inclusive fitness, ∆ω IF , and 84 solve for a monomorphic population that is at equilibrium: 85 ∆ω IF y=z=z * = 0 z * = 1 a − 1 r(n − 1) + 1 − W (a, k, n, r) n ,
where, W is a Lambert-W function which is strictly positive (see B) and r is the relatedness 86 between the different bacterial cells infecting the host. We define r as the probability that 87 two individuals share the same gene at a locus relative to the population average (Grafen, 88 1985) . This measure is obtained by replacing the regression of the recipients phenotype 89 on the focal individuals genotype (R in Taylor and Frank (1996) ) with: R = 1 n + n−1 n r.
a population under weak selection would converge to equilibrium (convergence stability), 94 we examined whether the second order terms at the equilibrium were negative (Otto and 95 Day, 2011). We found that:
if: a > 0, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, n ≥ 1, and W ≥ 0 .
So the equilibrium at z * is a candidate ESS. To determine uninvadibility we implement an 97 extension to the Taylor and Frank (1996) approach, by interpreting the second derivative 98 of the fitness equation in terms of inclusive fitness effects, therefore establishing a condition 99 for the candidate equilibrium to be a local maximum (Cooper and West, 2018) . In A we 100 show that z * is an uninvaidable strategy as well as being convergently stable. We found that increasing relatedness (r) increases individual toxin production. Examining 103 the derivative of the equilibrium toxin production (z * ) with respect to relatedness (r) we 104 found that:
So as relatedness (r) within the group increases the ESS of toxin also increases (z * ) 106 (C). Increasing relatedness increases the indirect benefit from toxin production as the 107 group chance of invasion, β(z), has a greater chance of being shared with kin. However, 108 even when relatedness is low (r = 0) toxin production is favoured as it is essential to to the accelerating section of the sigmoidal β(z) function (near the threshold). As the 114 benefits (β(z)) are accelerating, small increases in toxin production lead to large increases 115 in infection chance. Past the peak toxin production, the greater number of individuals in 116 the patch allow for individual bacteria to reduce their investment but the group remains 117 at a high chance of successfully invading (see D). The derivative of toxin production, z * , with respect to the threshold is always positive or 120 zero:
Therefore, in the absence of other limits if more toxin is required to invade the host (higher 122 k) individuals will be selected to increase their toxin production (z * ). Our model illustrates that the production of crystal toxin by the bacteria is a volunteer's 125 dilemma. Volunteer's dilemmas are a class of social games where the benefit is gained after 126 a threshold investment in the good is reached and the benefit is fixed for each member 127 regardless of group size or personal investment (Archetti, 2009 (Archetti, , 2018 , 2002; Collier et al., 2005; Raymond and Bonsall, 2013) . We capture this ecological 139 variation with a model which allows us to compare individuals that produce toxin at a 140 fixed level (cooperator) against individuals which do not produce any toxin (cheats). We 141 compare the relative fitness between these two types to determine under varying ecological 142 parameters.
143
We assume a population of bacteria whose spores freely mix and are taken up at 144 random by a host. We assume that the host ingests P bacterial spores. In the environment 
From eq. (3) given i cooperators in a group the payoff, π, for the focal bacteria producing 148 y toxin will be:
Therefore, the overall fitness of a focal bacteria producing y toxin in a population of 150 cooperators producing z toxin will be:
This allows us to express the fitness of a cooperator in the population as ω(z, z) and that of a cheat as ω(0, z). The relative fitness of cheats to cooperators in the population is: As the proportion of cheats increases we find that the relative fitness of cheats decreases 155 ( fig. 2a ). As cheats become more common, groups become dominated by cheats and The result of frequency independence requires either: (1) that the effect on public 160 good production is linear or, (2) that the trait is under weak selection. Either of these 161 two assumptions make a linear approximation, using a first order Taylor expansion, valid.
162
And, such expansions, are frequency independent (Rousset, 2004; Lehmann and Rousset, 163 2014). This argument is similar to the justification for frequency independent selection 164 of a trait that the selection gradient, s(z) = ∂ω/∂y + r∂ω/∂z, is constant with respect to 165 allele frequency (Hamilton, 1964; Gore et al., 2009; Lehmann and Rousset, 2014) .
166
However, in our model we find that the relative fitness of a cheat is frequency depen-167 dent. This is because we relax both of the assumptions made by Ross-Gillespie et al.
168
(2007). We have a non-linear synergistic effect between cooperators which means that 169 each cooperator or defector does not have a linear effect on the fitness of the focal individ-170 ual, due to the step like benefit function (β(z)). Addition or subtraction of a cooperator 171 has a large effect when a group is close to the the threshold but a much smaller effect when 172 the group toxin production is already very low or very high; the benefit of a cooperator 173 is dependent on the compisition of the group which is itself dependent on the frequency 174 of cooperators. This synergy introduces a frequency dependent term into the first order 175 effects of our selection gradient (Lehmann and Rousset, 2014). Secondly, we consider 176 a game with strong selection which makes approximating the gradient using only first 177 order terms inappropriate. The large difference between cooperator and cheat strategies causes higher order terms of the relative fitness to matter and these higher order terms will include frequency dependent terms (Hamilton, 1964; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007) .
180
These two effects lead to a frequency dependent relative fitness found here -unlike 181 the frequency independence found in earlier models (Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007) . The 182 synergistic game causes the first order term of the Taylor expansion to be frequency 183 dependent. The strong selection causes higher order terms to become more substantial.
184
These two effects are sufficient but not necessary conditions for frequency dependence to 185 arise. Increasing the density of the population, by increasing the group size (P ), increases rela-188 tive cheat fitness. In more dense populations there is a greater chance that a group will 189 have a sufficient number of cooperators to invade a host successfully ( fig. 2b ). The mean 190 number of cooperators in a group increases with density allowing cheats to exploit more 191 cooperators. In the limit, as P increases, the chance of infection for all patches in the 192 population is one, (β(z * ) = 1). Therefore, the fitness of cheats is 1 and the fitness of all 193 cooperators is 1 − az. The relative fitness of cheats then approaches, 1/(1 − az). 
202
So given that the patch is started by a cooperator then the distribution of number of 203 9 cooperators among such patches is:
and similarly for cheats:
The binomial coefficient is C(P −1, i−1) for cooperators as the founder individual counts δ 2 ), in terms of φ, c and d, we ensure that the sum over both distributions is equal to one, 215 and the terms are weighted probabilities.
216
The distribution of the number of cooperators in a patch is weighted by the fitness of 217 the focal individual in such a group (the sum of the above two distributions), giving:
and from this we calculate a structured relative fitness:
At maximum aggregation (φ = 1) cheats will do very poorly against cooperators as 220 groups formed of all cheats have almost zero chance of invading the host. In the absence of 221 aggregation (φ = 0), cheats will be performing as if the population were unstructured, as 222 in the previous model. As aggregation increases cheats are more likely to find themselves 223 in groups composed mostly of cooperators or mostly of cheats and very rarely a group 224 close to an unbiased distribution.
225
Intermediate levels of aggregation can, with intermediate frequencies of cooperators 226 and high densities, lead to an increase in cheat relative fitness ( fig. 3 ). When group sizes 227 are large the benefit to all members of a group of cooperators will approach one. At 228 that point any additional cooperators will perform much worse than additional cheats as 229 they will be paying the cost of producing toxin and gaining no marginal benefit from this 230 additional toxin (infection chance can't be greater than one). Therefore, at intermediate 231 levels of aggregation, enough cooperators will be on patches to infect a host and be 232 exploited by cheats. Conversely in the defector biased groups the threshold will never be 233 reached and cooperators perform poorly as they are paying a cost for little benefit and 234 any generated benefit is being exploited by cheats. This leads to high density scenarios 235 with intermediate levels of aggregation increasing cheat relative fitness.
236
The above method of looking at the relative fitness of cheats to cooperator shows 237 whether a cheat will be increasing or decreasing in the population. This gives a static We found that the production of toxin by the bacteria B. thurigiensis is diferent from 246 classical public goods games. The threshold nature of the toxin production leads to a 247 volunteer's dilemma where for each individual it would be optimal if another were to 248 volunteer to produce the good instead of them. We found, with a game theory approach, 249 that the ESS level of toxin production: (1) increases when the cells infecting a host 250 host are more related, and (2) peaks at intermediate numbers of cells infecting a host 251 ( fig. 1) . We then developed a stochastic model of the dynamics of cooperators that 252 produce toxin, and cheats that do not produce toxin. We found the relative fitness of 253 cheats was greater when: (1) they were less common (lower frequencies), (2) more cells benefit, which means that even when looking at first order terms frequency is present as 276 a variable (Rousset, 2004) . Secondly, in our models we assume that the cheater produces 277 no toxin and the cooperator produces a large quantity, leading to strong selection, which 278 means that linearising the relative fitness is no longer appropriate as higher order terms 
290
Our model also makes novel testable predictions. We predicted that the fitness of cells 291 that do not produce toxin (cheaters) depends upon an interaction between aggregation 292 and density (fig. 4) , and that toxin production should peak at intermediate group sizes
293
( fig. 1) . These predictions could be tested with field manipulations or experimental evo-294 lution. Our results also suggest the possibility for interactions between evolutionary and 295 ecological (population) dynamics, that require further theoretical and empirical work. For 296 example, low cell cell densities at the start of a season would favour cells that produce 297 toxin (cooperators), which would lead to an increase in cell densities. This would favour 298 cells that do not produce toxin (cheaters), which could reduce cell densities and now favour 299 toxin producers again. Furthermore, these changes in cell densities and the frequency of 300 toxin producers would also impact on the population dynamics of their invertebrate hosts, 301 which could also influence the number of cells infecting each host (Raymond et al., 2012) . if the equilibrium is unavailable. In brief, we consider the second derivative of the total 405 derivative taken to obtain the inclusive fitness effects (Taylor and Frank, 1996) . This ex-406 pands into a long chain rule where we drop all higher order terms (∂g 2 etc.) as negligible 407 and substitute the regression coefficients as before, leaving us with:
When this expression is less than zero we can say the equilibrium found is uninvaidable.
409

B Sign of the ProductLog
410
W is a Lambert-W function which is strictly positive. The Lambert-W function or Pro-411 ductLog function is the inverse of the functions in form Xe X :
In this case the function in full is:
From the above we can see that -assuming: a > 0, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 0 -then the 414 function within the brackets will be positive and therefore the value of the function will 415 be a positive real number. W (a, n, k, r) )
The expression obtained in eq. (20) is indeed always greater than or equal to zero forall 418 values of r in the internal [0, 1]. We can see this by first remembering that the function 419 W is always positive for any parameter set which is biologically reasonable -a > 0, 0 ≤ 420 r ≤ 1, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 0. We then see that the first term is positive in the denominator (a 421 squared term) and negative or zero in the numerator (1 − n where n ≥ 1), negating a 422 negative is of course positive so the first term has positive effect on slope. The second 423 term is also negative in the numerator as r − 1 is always zero or negative. Again it has 424 a positive effect as it is negated from the slope. Therefore as long as the parameters are 425 biologically reasonable the effect of increasing r is to increase investment in the toxin an In the paper we assume a cost of two-thirds and a threshold of two in all scenarios. This 429 was done so that in the case of two individuals total investment by both is necessary to 430 reach the threshold value in β(z). The reason that the cost was set to 2 3 was to represent 431 the fact that the tradeoff is against future investment not current investment. In fig. 5 we 432 can see a greater range of parameters which are presented here to show that the patterns 433 found are generally true across a reasonable range of parameter space.
434
( Peña et al., 2014 Peña et al., , 2015 . This allows us to draw general conclusions about the shape 437 and behaviour of this function by looking at a simple gain function. In essence we can 438 calculate a i as the payoff for cooperating when i others cooperate, and b i as the payoff 439 when defecting and i others cooperate.
These are used to generate a measure of the gain from switching given i cooperators:
Which gives a gain sequence:
Now the purpose of this process is that the signs of the elements in the gain sequence, d,
443
tell us the stability of the two trivial rest states of the system and the number and stability 444 of any interior rest points; assuming evolution occurs in an infinitely large well-mixed 445 population (Peña et al., 2014) . We are interested in three properties of the sequence: Figure 1 : The equilibrium toxin production depends on group size (n) and relatedness (r). a) When r > 0, as we increase group size, toxin production initially increases and then decreases. b) The total amount of toxin produced by the group, nz * , increases with group size, therefore, the chance of infecting the host is always higher in larger groups. These graphs assume k = 2 and a = 2 3 (D). Figure 2 : (a) The relative fitness of cheats is negatively frequency dependent as cheats become more common they are more often aggregated together and so suffer in relative fitness to cooperators. (b) As group size increases there is a positive density dependent effect on cheat fitness, the larger the group the more chance that sufficient toxin is produced by the group Figure 3 : Graphs of ω S , eq. (14), using parameters: k = 2, a = 2/3 and z = 0.17. (a) When group size is low, P = 5 increasing aggregation leads to decreasing relative fitness for cheats regardless of the initial cooperator frequency (b) At higher group sizes (P = 10) the pattern is also decreasing at high cooperator frequencies however at middling and low densities we see a non monotonic pattern with an intermediate aggregation causing a maximum relative fitness in cheats. Group Size (n) Cooperator toxin production (z)
Equilibrium Type
Defector Mixed Cooperator Figure 6 : This figure shows the dynamics of a population of cooperators and defectors as described by eq. (10). Each point represents a poulation with n group size and cooperators that produce z toxin. Using the criteria for the gain sequence for each population we cklassify it as either a defector only equilibrium a cooperator only one or a mixed equilibrium where the two strategies coexist. The graph was drawn using the parameters, a = 2 3 and k = 2
